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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 The “Competitiveness” decree in 2014 introduced in italian 
law loyalty shares and multiple voting shares – already known to other 
countries (eg. US and France) – that allow voting right different from 
one share - one vote principle. 
 These mechanisms permit shareholder to exercise in the 
shareholders’ meeting more power than the resources invested and to 
achieve a dissociation between risk and power. 
 Voting doubled was extended to listed companies, in a context 
always characterized by a greater number of mandatory law. It was 
therefore decided to offer to Italian listed companies an instrument 
capable of affecting the targetability of the company, so as not to 
passively suffer competition from other legal systems, including 
European. 
 The new law intended to stem the reluctance to listing, very 
frequent in Italy. Many have said that the new law would allow to divest 
state holdings. 
 Beyond the declared intentions and those unexpressed, the 
real innovative capacity of loyalty shares and multiple voting shares 
should be evaluated in practice. 
 For this reason, the research includes an appendix with the 
analysis of the 26 statutes that have introduced double voting with 
summary tables. 
	
